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The right to due process requires that in order to find a 
person in violation of his probation, the trial court must make 
specific findings so as to clarify the evidence on which it relied. 
Even if it had attmpted to make such findings, there was 
insufficient evidence before the court for it to find that 
Mr. Hodges had failed to comply with the specific term of his 
probation that he participate in the Bonneville Sex Offenders 
Program. 
SUBMITTED this O^ day of May, 1990. 
Attorney Tor Defendant/Appellant 
<3fo-e. (j)aly 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, JOAN C. WATT, hereby certify that eight copies of the 
foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals, 400 
Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, and 
four copies to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this 20 day of May, 1990. 
^#/vS> 
JOAN C.^WATT 
DELIVERED by this day 
of May, 1990. 
- 2 -
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
EARLY GILBERT HODGES, JR., 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 890086-CA 
Priority No. 2 
INTRODUCTION 
The statements of jurisdiction, issues, case, and facts are 
set forth in Appellant's opening brief. Appellant replies to 
Appellee's brief as follows: 
ARGUMENT 
POINT. MR. HODGES' RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS WAS 
VIOLATED WHEN THE TRIAL JUDGE TERMINATED HIS 
PROBATION UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE, 
A. THE TRANSCRIPT DOES NOT ESTABLISH THE TRIAL 
JUDGE'S SPECIFIC FINDINGS; NOR DOES IT CLARIFY THE 
EVIDENCE HE RELIED ON. 
The State is correct in asserting that in Morishita v. 
Morris, 621 P.2d 691, 693 n.l (Utah 1980) fMorishita I). the Utah 
Supreme Court stated: 
We are aware of the due process requirements set 
forth in Gaanon v. Scarpelli [citation omitted], for 
probation revocation proceedings, yet find the 
requirement for written findings inapplicable in the 
instant case. First, the standards set forth in 
Gaanon were addressed to administrative revocation 
proceedings which required no transcript, no 
judicial moderator, and no counsel, as opposed to 
the instant circumstance of a judicial proceeding 
with probationer being represented by counsel and a 
transcript being maintained.1 
Implicit in Morishita I, as clarified in Morishita v. 
Morris, 702 F.2d 207, 210 (10th Cir. 1983), is the idea that written 
findings are not required only if the transcript and record clarify 
the basis for the revocation. 
In State v. Parsons, 717 P.2d 99 (N.M. App. 1986) (cited by 
the State on p. 12 of its brief), the Court held that the trial 
court was required to adopt specific findings of fact or "indicate 
in the record its determination of whether defendant had the ability 
to pay the sums ordered and whether defendant's failure to pay was 
willful." The Court noted: 
Black fv. Romano1. however, finds that in a 
revocation hearing, procedural due process is 
satisfied where probationer has an opportunity to 
present mitigating evidence and to argue 
alternatives to imprisonment and, additionally, the 
factfinder states the reason for its decision and 
the evidence relied on. 
Id. at 103 (emphasis added). In the absence of such specific 
findings, the court remanded the case for additional findings. 
In the present case, the trial judge apparently violated 
Mr. Hodges7 probation because Appellant failed to participate in the 
1
 Such statement was made in a footnote and is not the 
holding of the case. In Morishita I. the defendant raised his claim 
that the trial court had not entered written findings for the first 
time in a habeas corpus proceeding. The Court held that the 
petitionees claim did not affect the fundamental fairness of the 
proceedings, especially in view of the fact that a transcript of the 
proceedings had been made and therefore could not be raised for the 
first time in a habeas proceeding. 
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Bonneville Program, A review of the transcript fails to elucidate 
what specific acts Mr. Hodges did or did not do which led to the 
trial judge's conclusion. Mr. Hodges was informed only that he 
failed to "fully participate" (T 37-8) as the trial judge defined 
that term, and that although he did some things, he did not 
"effectively participate" in the program (T 38-9). The transcript 
in this case is not an adequate substitute for written findings. 
B. THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT A FINDING THAT 
MR. HODGES VIOLATED THE TERMS OF HIS PROBATION. 
The State argues that application of the rationale in 
Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983), to the instant case is 
improper because in Black v. Romano. 471 U.S. 606 (1985), the United 
States Supreme Court "specifically declined to extend Bearden beyond 
indigency cases . . . ." State's brief at 10-11. Such argument 
breathes too much life into the quoted statement in Romano. 
In Romano, the issue was whether the due process clause 
required "a sentencing court to indicate that it has considered 
alternatives to incarceration before revoking probation." 471 U.S. 
at 607. While the Court was unwilling to extend Bearden to require 
such a consideration of alternatives, it does not follow that the 
substantive cine process limitatioi I of Bearden is not applicable to 
other contexts. Concededly, Bearden is not directly on point in the 
instant case; nevertheless, the concerns espoused in Bearden 
regarding an individual's interest in remaining on probation and the 
existence of substantive due process limits on revocation of such 
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probation are applicable. See State v. Parsons, 717 P.2d 99, 120 
(N.M. App. 1986) (cited by the State at p. 12 of its brief) ("In 
Black [v. Romano]. the court observed that due process imposes 
procedural and substantive limits on the revocation of a defendant's 
conditional liberty interest created by probation"). 
The statute discussed by the Court in Williams v. Harris, 
149 P.2d 640 (Utah 1944), (cited by the State at p. 12 of its 
brief), is significantly different from the statute in effect when 
the trial court sentenced Mr. Hodges. Nevertheless, Williams points 
out that "the right of personal liberty and suspended sentence 'may 
not be alternatively granted and denied without just cause'" 
[citation omitted] and that the legislature "never intended that 
trial courts should implant hope and faith into one with the right 
to destroy this as a whim, without just cause." 149 P.2d at 642. 
In State v. Cowdell. 626 P.2d 487, 488 (Utah 1981), the 
Court acknowledged that although "[t]he decision of a trial court to 
modify or revoke a probation is basically a discretionary one, . . . 
in revoking a probation, a court may not ignore fundamental precepts 
of fairness protected by the due process clause." The Court 
determined that although a "pleading in a criminal case may not be 
defective for failure to allege the time a particular offense 
occurred," notice for a probation revocation requires that an 
allegation as to the time of the alleged occurrence be included in 
order to comport with due process. The rationale for the more 
stringent protection in a probation revocation proceeding than in a 
trial is that the probationer has not had a prior hearing or 
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discovery, and requires the notice to adequately present 
controverting evidence. Hence, in some instances, due process 
actually requires greater protection in a probation revocation 
hearing than in a criminal trial. 
Various cases dealing with probation revocation suggest 
that a probationer must "abuse[] this opportunity" in order to 
revoke probation. State v. Dubish, 696 P.2d 969, 974 (Kan. 1985); 
see State v. Bonza. 150 P.2d 970, 972 (Utah 1944) ("As long as the 
defendant to whom leniency has been extended keeps faith with the 
court and the agency which supervises his probation, he is entitled 
to the benefit of the probation or suspension"); see also State v. 
Eichler, 483 P.2d 887, 889 (Utah 1971) ("[F]airness and effective 
use of probation demand that a defendant who is placed on probation 
should have the assurance that if he keeps the conditions of his 
probatioi :i i t will contd .nue ") In the present case, although 
the therapists concluded that Mr. Hodges would need four years to 
complete the program, all of the underlying acts testified to by 
either the therapists or Mr. Hodges demonstrate that he was 
participating to the best of his ability and not "abusing" his 
opportunity to be on probation. 
The State relies on the "flexible nature of a probation 
revocation hearing" to argue that the therapists were not required 
to articulate a basi s for their conclusions. However, it is 
entirely consistent with the "flexible nature of a probation 
revocation proceeding" (State's brief at 11) to require that 
testimony have acieqiiate foundati on and reliability, that witnesses 
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explain the bases for their conclusions, and that sufficient 
evidence that the probationer violated a term of probation be 
required. See State v. Tulipaine, 596 P.2d 695, 696 (Ariz. 1979) 
(no error where trial court refused to admit polygraph results at 
probation revocation hearing due to lack of reliability of polygraph 
examinations); People v. Maki, 704 P.2d 743 (Cal. 1985) (hearsay 
must be reliable in order to introduce at probation revocation 
hearing). 
The concerns espoused in State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388 
(Utah 1989), that the factfinder might "abandon its responsibility" 
and simply adopt the conclusions of experts without analyzing the 
underlying facts are just as applicable to a probation revocation 
hearing as they are to a trial. 
In its brief, the State points out that "Dr. Cespedes 
believed that defendant had been manipulative, using his medication 
to justify his behavior and inability to progress in therapy." 
Appellee's brief at 15. The transcript establishes that this 
testimony by Dr. Cespedes actually related to the three-or-four-
month period before Mr. Hodges went to the Veterans Administration 
Hospital and had his medication changed2 and not the four-to-five-
month period following the trip to the Veterans Administration 
Hospital. Rather than suggesting that Mr. Hodges was manipulative 
following the trip to the hospital and change in medication, 
2
 As outlined in Appellant's opening brief at 4, Appellant 
went to the VA Hospital three or four months after entering 
Bonneville and four or five months before the State filed the Order 
to Show Cause in this case. 
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Dr. Cespedes' testimony demonstrates that Mr. Hodges behavior 
improved during the last several months in the program. 
Dr. Cespedes testified: 
Sof Mr. Hodges' behavior did change after the 
evaluation and changing in medication at the VA, but 
that was more the result of a confrontation to get 
him to lower or stop manipulating more than a change 
in medication itself. 
(T 9). This testimony demonstrates that the therapy at Bonneville 
was working and Mr. Hodges7 behavior was improving significantly 
during his last several months in the program. 
The State also points out that "Dr. Kramer found that 
defendant lost motivation and that it was difficult to get him to 
work hard and consistently." Appellee's brief at 15. While the 
State's depiction of the testimony suggests Mr. Hodges simply 
stopped working, Dr. Kramer actually testified that Mr. Hodges would 
try, then lose motivation, then try again for awhile, then lose 
motivation again (T 21). Again, Dr. Kramer offered no specific 
examples nor any testimony as to how he assessed the level of 
Mr. Hodges' motivation. Specific examples, including the fact that 
Dr. Kramer complimented Mr. Hodges several times on his progress 
after returning from the evaluation at the Veterans Administration 
Hospital, suggest that Mr. Hodges was motivated following the VA 
evaluation. As outlined further in Appellant's opening brief at 5, 
18-19, Dr. Kramer also testified that he was unable to tell whether 
assignments were completed correctly or the therapy was having an 
impact on sexual arousal without use of the plethysmograph. 
Therefore, Dr. Kramer's testimony demonstrates an inability to 
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ascertain whether Mr. Hodges was benefiting from the therapy. 
In the present case, where the therapists offered only 
conclusions and no underlying examples of behavior which would 
establish that Mr. Hodges was not participating and where Mr. Hodges 
continued to participate to the best of his ability, society's 
interest in reformation and Appellant's interest in remaining on 
probation absent an "abuse of [that] opportunity" are both best 
served by reinstating Appellant's probation. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse the 
trial court's order violating his probation and remand the case with 
an order that probation be reinstated. 
SUBMITTED this 3* day of May, 1990. 
A^—>lSfa>r>~^ 
KAREN STAM 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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